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0Abstract. In this paper, a theory of the artificial recently proposed by Negrotti (1999a, 
1999b, 2001a, 2001b) is critically examined1. First, a brief overview of this theory is 
presented. It is then argued that despite the merits of this scheme, principal of which are 
the self-evident simplicity of its conceptual foundations, its internal consistency (or 
theoretical coherence), and its possible overall correctness, it is, nonetheless, incomplete. 
This incompleteness is shown to arise as a direct consequence of the explicit affirmation 
of a number of problematic metaphysical assumptions about the nature (as essence or 
what-ness) of nature (as ‘other’ to the artificial). An attempt at resolving the problem of 
incompleteness by augmenting the Negrottian theory of artificiality with an alternative 
conception of nature (as ‘other’) grounded in Whiteheadian panexperientialism is made. 
It is shown that although panexperientialism provides an adequate framework for the 
conceptualisation of naturality, it does not provide a corresponding framework for 
artificiality, principally because it fails to adequately characterise the nature (as essence) 
of artifacts. In order to address this latter problem, it is argued that conventional 
Whiteheadian panexperientialism must be supplemented with a phenomenological 
account of artificing that describes the ontologically distinct manner in which artifacts 
come to be. An attempt at formulating such a ‘neo-Whiteheadian’ account grounded in 
the metaphysical thinking of Ladrière, Lee, and others is made. In closing, some 
implications of this alternative Whiteheadian conception of naturality and the attendant 
neo-Whiteheadian account of artifactuality for the project of “strong” artificiality (that is, 
the attempt to artifactually replicate natural phenomena) are briefly considered. 
 
1. 1Introduction 
 
What is meant by the expression ‘the nature of the artificial’? From an informed yet 
lay perspective, two answers to this question suggest themselves. First, and perhaps 
somewhat more intuitively, the expression can be taken to refer to the essence (or what-
ness) of the artificial. Second, and perhaps a little more obscurely, it can also be taken to 
refer to that which stands as ‘other’ to the artificial. From the standpoint of serious 
philosophical inquiry, however, answers such as those given above merely scratch the 
surface of the problem, and principally because their very mode of formulation 
                                                 
1 The most detailed presentation of this theory appears in a work (Negrotti, 1999a) bearing a title that is 
clearly inspired by that of Herbert Simon’s seminal monograph, The Sciences of The Artificial (1969). 
However, Negrotti’s title is much bolder in that it appears to imply (1) that a single, all-encompassing 
theory of the artificial is possible, (2) that there is only one such theory possible, and (3) that Negrotti’s 
theory is such a theory. Granted, for the sake of argument, the validity of (1) and (2), it remains the case 
that, if the critique presented herein is sound, (3) must be false since, as will be shown in what follows, 
Negrotti’s theory is incomplete. 
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necessitates consideration of an indefinite, possibly infinite, number of other issues2. For 
example, what is the artificial? Why the artificial rather than an artificial? Similarly, and 
granting for the moment that the meaning of nature is exhausted by the above two 
formulations, why the nature as opposed to a nature? In a related manner, yet with 
specific reference to the first answer, there is also the need to consider, reflexively, meta-
theoretically or otherwise, the meaning of essence (or what-ness). Still further, and with 
reference to the second answer, there is the need to determine precisely what other-ness 
(or, following Levinas, ‘alterity’) means. 
Clearly, attempting to address all these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, as will be seen in what follows, it is necessary to engage at least some of them 
in order to fulfil the central objective of this work which is to mount a constructive 
critique of Negrotti’s theory of the artificial. Principally, in order to provide a contextual 
platform for such an investigation, it will be necessary to briefly examine what is meant 
by the term ‘nature’ and it is this issue that will now be addressed. 
 
2. Concepts of Nature 
 
That there are almost as many concepts of nature as there are thinkers who have 
pondered this issue is a truism3. For example, according to Collingwood (1945), “the 
Ionian physicists, when they asked the question ‘What is nature?’, at once converted it 
into the question ‘What are things made of?’” (p.43) For Aristotle, the answer to the latter 
was always to be given in terms of the respective roles played by matter (or stuff) and 
form (or structure) in the becoming of a thing (or substance). Furthermore, and consistent 
with the Platonic view, it is form that is primary4; as Collingwood states, it is the notion 
of nature as ‘principle’ (source or essence) “which we recognise to be its original and, 
strictly, its proper sense.” Crucially, on his view, this classical perspective contrasts 
sharply with the modern one that conceives nature simply as “the sum total of natural 
things.” (p.43) The somewhat problematic (since self-referential) nature of this 
formulation aside, what is striking is its neutrality with respect to the issue of essence 
which supports both essentialist and constructivist interpretations of the concept5. 
According to Soper (1995), “the constructivist speaks of nature as a cultural effect 
and emphasises the semiotic roles of the concept in mediating access to the reality it 
names.” (p.312) Although, in radical or “strong” versions of constructivism there is no 
                                                 
2 This is true irrespective of whether an ‘analytic’ (that is, logical) or ‘Continental’ (that is, phenomeno-
logical) approach to philosophical inquiry is adopted.  
3 In this connection, Haila (2000) maintains that “it is not quite obvious whether ‘nature’ has been the same 
in different cultures except in the abstract sense of being outside each culture, and in the even more abstract 
sense of being part of the same physical reality.” (pp.163-164) However, this position is readily shown to 
be problematic from an onto-phenomenological perspective because the externality (that is, ‘being outside’) 
of nature, interpreted as the ontological a priority of the latter relative to human being (Ali 1999), is not 
something abstract. On the contrary, it is phenomenologically concrete in the sense that it involves the 
experience of nature as ‘given’. 
4 According to Lee (1999), “Aristotle maintained that [the pre-Socratics] had failed to distinguish between 
first matter and second matter. First matter may be said to be primary as ultimate matter, in the absolute 
sense. For instance the ultimate matter of bronze is probably water. But Aristotle’s natural philosophy 
focused instead on second matter which consists of primary matter and the form or essence, and is the end 
of all becoming [emphasis added].” (pp.33-34) 
5 On the former, nature is a given; on the latter, nature – or rather, ‘nature’ - is a human social construct. 
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reality beyond the mediating concept, Soper (2000) maintains that “a realist concept of 
nature is .. a suppressed or repressed ontological presupposition of much that passes for 
‘constructivism’.” (p.19) On her view, a distinction must be made between what she calls 
‘deep’ and ‘surface’ nature, that is, between “that which is the condition of all human 
modifications and the perceptible domain of ‘nature’ that is the outcome of these 
modifications [emphasis added].” (p.17) Haila (2000) is similarly led to distinguish 
between ‘first’ and ‘second’ nature: 
 
The former term refers to such elements in the world that have originated without human influence 
– this, by and large, in the physical background of culture. The latter term refers to such elements 
in the world that have originated from previous human activities. (pp.167-168) 
 
Notwithstanding the anthropocentricity of her (and Haila’s) position, Soper (1995) 
maintains that there are three distinct senses of nature: (1) Metaphysical - “the concept 
referring to the difference and specificity of humanity”; (2) Realist - “the structures, 
processes, and causal powers that are constantly operative within the world, serve as 
objects of study of the natural sciences, and condition the possible forms of human 
intervention in biology or interaction with the environment”; and (3) Lay (or surface) - 
“the nature of immediate experience and aesthetic appreciation.” (pp.319-320) Adopting 
a neo-Aristotelian perspective, Lee (1999) goes somewhat further to distinguish seven 
different senses of nature: (1) Naturenh - non-human nature; (2) Naturec - cosmological 
nature; (3) Naturep - pristine nature; (4) Naturehi - human-impacted nature; (5) Naturefa -
foil to the artifactual or nature as ‘other’; (6) Naturenk - natural kinds; and (7) Naturef - 
first matter or nature as ultimate ontological substrate or stuff. (pp.82-83) For the 
purposes of the present enquiry, however, the three senses of nature identified by Ferré 
(1988) are sufficient6: (pp.28-29) 
 
1. nature1 - “the collective term for all that exists apart from the artificial”; 
2. nature2 - “all that exists in the evolving universe of space and time”; 
3. nature3 - that which is essential in a thing, that is, that which is expressed “all other things 
being equal, when it develops according to its kind without outside interference.” 
 
In the next section, the role played by each of these notions in Negrotti’s theory of the 
artificial will be examined.  
 
3. 2Negrottian Artificiality 
 
In a recent series of works, Negrotti (1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b) has proposed a 
theory that aims at clarifying the nature (in the sense of essence, what-ness or nature3) of 
the artificial. On his view, ‘the artificial’ refers to 
 
any object, process or machine that aims to reproduce some pre-existing natural object or process by 
means of different materials and procedures. (Negrotti 1999a, p.1) 
                                                 
6 It is interesting to note that (3) and (1) correspond to the intuitive (nature as essence or what-ness) and 
somewhat more obscure (nature as ‘other’) conceptions of nature identified in §1 respectively, while (2) 
corresponds to Collingwood’s ‘modern’ conception of nature (as the totality of things). 
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By ‘reproduction’ is understood mimetic production of the ‘essential performance’ 
(or behaviour) of a natural exemplar based on a more or less shared representation of the 
latter from a particular observational perspective (or level). More formally, Negrotti 
(2001a) defines the artificial in terms of the following three conditions7: (p.5) 
 
1. A necessary condition: the object or the process must be built by man; 
2. A sufficient condition: the object or the process must be inspired by a natural one; 
3. A methodological constraint: the object or the process must be realised by means of materials and 
procedures different from those nature adopts. 
 
Although Negrotti emphasises the grounding of his theory in the triad of observation, 
exemplar and essential performance, it is the latter two notions and the role played by 
what is referred to as ‘conventional technology’ in the theory that are relevant to the 
critique of Negrottian artificiality presented herein. In terms of Ferré’s three senses of 
nature (§2), the notion of an exemplar – more specifically, a natural exemplar – 
necessitates consideration of nature1 (that is, nature as ‘other’) while that of an essential 
performance necessitates consideration of nature3 (that is, nature as what-ness or 
essence). In what follows, it is argued that the way in which these notions are 
conceptualised is critical to the success of the theory of the artificial. This is because how 
nature1 and nature3 are conceived (at least partially) determines the extent to which 
technological products (or artifacts) and the processes (of artificing) that engender them 
can be shown to be ontologically similar to (or distinct from) the corresponding naturals 
they seek to reproduce. In short, nature2 (that is, nature as an existential totality that 
encompasses the artifactual and hence, the artificial) is at issue. 
Prior to discussing the philosophical problems associated with Negrottian artificiality, 
it is important to appreciate the merits of this theory. These are, arguably, (1) the self-
evident simplicity of its conceptual foundations, (2) its internal consistency (or theoretical 
coherence), and (3) its possible overall correctness. Nonetheless, it is maintained that 
Negrotti’s theory of the artificial fails the test of adequacy (or closure) because it is 
incomplete. In what follows, it will be shown that this incompleteness arises as a direct 
consequence of the explicit affirmation of a number of problematic metaphysical 
assumptions about the nature3 (as essence or what-ness) of nature1 (as ‘other’ to the 
artificial). From the perspective of this critique, two of these are particularly significant: 
essentialism (that is, the view that there is an essence or what-ness associated with every 
phenomenon) and realism (that is, the view that a human-independent reality exists)8. 
 
4. 3The Philosophy of The Artificial 
 
It is important to appreciate at the outset that Negrottian essentialism is wholly 
epistemic in character, being motivated by an operationalist (that is, performative or 
                                                 
7 Strictly speaking, these conditions are not separable into necessary, sufficient and methodological in the 
way that Negrotti has attempted to show; rather, when taken together as a set, they constitute necessary and 
sufficient conditions for artificiality. 
8 Other assumptions such as representationalism (that is, the view that cognition necessarily involves 
representations) are not examined in this paper. However, the issue of observation which is, arguably, 
related to the question of representationalism, will be addressed, albeit indirectly, in the context of a 
discussion of the phenomenon of consciousness and its possible bearing on essentialism and realism. 
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behavioural) perspective on the possibility of artificial reproduction of the natural. As 
Negrotti (2001a) states, “what we name the essential performance of a natural exemplar 
always is ‘essential’ with reference to some specific observational level, and not in 
ontological terms.” (p.8) On his view, “the problem of the essential truth [in an 
ontological sense] is beyond the possibilities of human effort [since] the only strategies 
available to man are those of knowing or reproducing the world through operational 
expedients that pragmatically capture what is compatible with the assumed model and the 
multiple selections it implies.” (Negrotti 1999a, p.67) Crucially, as he goes on to state, 
“questions such as ‘what is reality in and of itself’ have no meaning in the context of [the 
theory of the artificial]. The reality we refer to is the reality we can potentially or actually 
perceive, and not its ontology.” (p.3) However, such epistemic essentialism should not be 
taken to entail a commitment to ontological relativism of the subjectivist kind since 
“there is something in the world that exists independently of our mind, with a life of its 
own.” (p.2) In short, Negrotti appears to be committed to epistemological essentialism 
and ontological realism. However, it is crucial to appreciate that on his version of 
realism, there are two ‘orders’ of natural reality, the accessible (sensible or perceptible) 
and the inaccessible. As he states, “the objects that we perceive from the observation 
levels that we assume in each unit of time and space are not ‘pieces’ or partial spheres of 
reality: rather, they are the verifiable reality that we can grasp from those selected levels.” 
(Negrotti 1999a, p.13) 
In addition, it is important to note that on Negrotti’s view, natural phenomena are 
hierarchically structured; however, it is somewhat unclear whether such hierarchies are 
ontological or merely epistemic. Furthermore, the impossibility of knowing the relations 
between all levels in such hierarchies suggests that, for Negrotti, naturals are infinitely – 
as opposed to indefinitely - disclosable. Explicit evidence in support of such a view is 
provided by statements such as the following: “the observational levels of concrete reality 
- both of the natural and of the artificial reality - and their interplays have to be 
considered as infinite” (pp.36-37); again, there are “endless levels of potential 
observation” (p.70). However, it is again somewhat unclear whether infinite 
disclosability refers to accessible or inaccessible reality; while it is clear that Negrotti 
holds inaccessible reality to be infinite9, the ‘as’ appearing in the first of the latter 
statements would seem to imply that accessible reality is structured as a finite hierarchy. 
 
5. Problems with The Theory of The Artificial 
 
One of the principle advantages of the above hybrid epistemological-essentialist and 
ontological-realist position – which Negrotti refers to as ‘objective relativism’ - over 
alternatives is that it does not give rise to the epistemic fallacy10 in connection with the 
natural11. This is significant because erasure (or collapse) of the nature-artifact distinction 
                                                 
9 Negrotti (1999a) maintains that “reality includes, that is to say, it has in itself, all the features observable 
by all the species, along with infinite others which cannot be observed by any species and which are 
sometimes revealed through investigations using scientific instruments.” (p.14) 
10 This is the error of conflating representations of reality with reality itself. 
11 The situation in relation to the artificial is somewhat different since “no particular difference exists 
between the situation in which the artificialist looks at reality as it is and the one in which the artificialist 
constructs reality, i.e. sees what he wants to see.” (Negrotti 1999a, p.69) 
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under both naïve essentialism (everything is natural) and its antithesis, radical 
constructivism (everything is artificial in the sense of artifactual) can be shown to be 
grounded in the epistemic fallacy (Soper 2000). Thus, Negrotti’s theory appears to 
provides a sound basis upon which to mount a defence of the legitimacy of this 
distinction12. Yet granted the clarity, coherence and (overall) correctness of Negrotti’s 
theory of the artificial, it remains unclear whether it is, in fact, complete by which is 
meant that it provides an adequate characterisation of all the elements in the theory, for 
example, the nature3 (as essence or what-ness) of nature1 (as ‘other’ to the artificial). The 
need to resolve this issue becomes pressing once it is appreciated that the epistemic 
fallacy arises only if it is assumed, following Kant, that appearance does not – cannot - 
disclose the whole of reality and that knowing is, ultimately, separated from being. It is 
precisely these ‘transcendental’ realist assumptions that are contested by Heidegger. 
As Schatzki (1982) has shown, Heidegger is an empirical realist: On his view, what 
something is ‘in itself’ is what it is independently of its actually being encountered by a 
Dasein (that is, a being capable of appreciating the being of a being); as stated 
previously, Kant, by contrast, is a transcendental realist: On his view, what something is 
‘in itself’ is what it is independently of any possible knowledge of it. Negrottian 
essentialism ostensibly mediates these two kinds of realism in affirming the existence of 
an accessible reality – that is, one that is potentially or actually capable of being 
perceived – on the one hand, while simultaneously acknowledging the existence of an 
inaccessible reality on the other. Such a move appears consistent with Heidegger’s (1971) 
assertion that being is self-concealing and, thereby, always remains (at least) partly 
undisclosed. However, it is important to appreciate that that which is undisclosed (or 
unaccessed) is not necessarily identical to that which is undisclosable (or inaccessible). 
On this basis, it might be argued that the incompleteness of Negrotti’s theory has its 
source in the erroneous assumption that ontological relativism entails ontological 
agnosticism and the implications of this fact for his conception of the natural. Clearly, his 
identification of reality as it is ‘in-itself’ with an inaccessible reality implies a tacit 
commitment to a Kantian conception of the real. On his view, “it does not matter what 
the world is in itself, since the only ways we have at our disposal to describe the world 
are our representations of it.” (Negrotti 1999a, p.15) However, such a representationalist 
or constructivist position is readily shown to be problematic when the question 
concerning the ontological status (appearance or reality) of the phenomenon of 
consciousness is considered. As Searle (1992) has rightly argued, “where appearance is 
concerned we cannot make the appearance-reality distinction because the appearance is 
the reality” (p.122). In short, at least in the case of consciousness, reality is accessible and 
as it is in-itself. 
The foregoing might seem to suggest that Heidegger is a surer guide than Kant, at 
least with respect to the question concerning the ontology of the natural. While this view 
is partially correct given the consistency of Heidegger’s empirical realism with the 
phenomenological facticity of direct, unmediated access to the reality of consciousness, it 
does not take into consideration the fact that Heidegger’s own conception of the natural is 
itself highly problematic. On his view, nature as it is in-itself is ‘absurd’, intrinsically 
meaningless and essentially non-experiential (Heidegger 1927). This point is of critical 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether this remains the case if the distinction is given a ‘strong’ (or 
ontological) as opposed to a ‘weak’ (or merely epistemological) interpretation. 
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significance since in endorsing empirical realism while simultaneously conceiving nature 
as intrinsically non-experiential, Heidegger is confronted with the ‘hard problem’ of 
consciousness (Chalmers 1996), that is, the problem of explaining how ontological 
subjectivity (or first-person experience) can arise from an ontologically-objective (or 
non-experiential) substrate. Heidegger cannot solve this problem because of his 
commitment to an ontological dualism of experiential subjects and non-experiential 
objects, a categorial distinction that is clearly at odds with the assumption of ontological 
continuity (or monism) that is, arguably, a cornerstone of that scientific naturalism with 
which empirical realism is aligned13. 
It is worthwhile briefly summarising what has been established thus far in the 
discussion. First, some form of empirical realism must be correct since consciousness is 
an accessible reality and it constitutes at least one instance of reality as it is in-itself. 
Second, Heidegger’s particular brand of empirical realism is problematic in that it cannot 
solve the ‘hard problem’ on account of its assumption of a non-experiential (or 
‘vacuous’) nature3 (as essence or what-ness) of nature1 (as ‘other’ to the artificial). From 
these facts it follows that in order to circumvent the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness 
while simultaneously endorsing empirical realism, it is necessary to reconsider the 
ontology of nature1. 
 
6. Whiteheadian Naturality 
 
Griffin (1998) defines Whiteheadian panexperientialism as a process-atomism in 
which the fundamental units of nature1 are held to be dipolar physical-mental events of 
finite duration (actual occasions of experience), relationally-constituted via a process of 
actualisation (concresence) involving creative selection of physical feelings (prehensions) 
of actualised events (objects) by actualising events (subjects). Crucially, Griffin (2000) 
maintains that 
 
[the] embodiment of creativity in each actual occasion involves two modes. In the first mode, it is 
embodied in the occasion’s moment of subjectivity, during which the occasion enjoys its own 
experience. This mode has two poles: the ‘physical pole’, during which the occasion receives the 
[efficient] causal influence from the past, and the ‘mental pole’, during which it exercises its own final 
causation or self-determination. Following this subjective mode of existence, the occasion exists in its 
objective [or ‘superjective’] mode, which means that it is an object for subsequent subjects. In this 
mode, its capacity to exercise self-determination is over, but it can now exercise efficient causation 
upon others. (p.176) 
 
Prehensions (or feelings) are differentiable into two kinds: physical and conceptual; 
in the former, the objects of prehension are concrete actualities (that is, prior actual 
occasions) while in the latter, the objects of prehension are abstract potentialities (that is, 
Platonic forms or what Whitehead refers to as ‘eternal objects’). Physical prehensions can 
be further differentiated into pure and hybrid kinds, the former providing the explanation 
                                                 
13 This point is somewhat contentious. According to Dreyfus (1991), emprical realism is consistent with 
scientific naturalism; hence, Heidegger would presumably support some kind of scientifically-realist 
account of the evolution of consciousness from a non-conscious (or ‘vacuous’) substrate. However, Pylkkö 
(1998) and Christensen (1998) have separately argued that this ‘naturalism-friendly’ interpretation of 
Heidegger is incorrect. Clearly, the critique of Heidegger presented here assumes the validity of the 
Dreyfusian reading. 
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for the almost complete uniformity of nature at the subatomic level and the latter, for the 
possibility of phenomenal evolution. According to Griffin (1998), 
 
in a pure physical feeling, the previous actual occasion is felt in terms of its own physical pole, which 
means that what is passed on to the present occasion is what the past occasion had in turn received 
from previous occasions. Accordingly, even if some novelty cropped up in the mental pole of that 
previous occasion, it is bypassed by a pure physical prehension. What we usually think of as the 
‘physical world’ in the strictest sense – roughly, the world of subatomic entities, atoms, and ordinary 
molecules – is characterised (by hypothesis) almost entirely by pure physical feelings. The virtually 
indestructible proton is the paradigmatic instance, as it retains its character over many billions of years 
.. The so-called laws of nature are merely habits to be sure, but the enduring individuals at that level 
are so habit-bound (at least when in inorganic surroundings) that the laws can appear to be imposed. 
All the causal relations at this level can appear to be ‘purely physical’ because they are: All the 
efficient causation between events involves physical prehension. 
In a hybrid physical feeling, by contrast, the previous occasion of experience is prehended in terms 
of its mental pole, with its conceptual feelings. This is still a type of physical feeling, because the 
objects felt is an actuality, not a mere possibility. But it is a hybrid physical feeling because that prior 
actuality is felt in terms of its prehension of possibilities. Among these possibilities may be some novel 
forms, meaning ones not simply received from the past world. If this occurs, then a future occasion of 
experience, by means of a hybrid physical feeling, can incorporate that novel form into its own 
physical pole. From then on this once-novel form can be passed on to subsequent occasions in the 
enduring individual by means of pure physical feelings. (pp.194-195) 
 
It is important to appreciate that, unlike crude panpsychism, panexperientialism does 
not assert (1) that all beings are experiential nor (2) that those beings that are experiential 
are experiential in the same way14. On this metaphysics, only the fundamental primitives 
of nature (that is, actual occasions of experience) and certain complexes (‘societies’ or 
‘nexūs’) constituted from combinations of these primitives are held to be experiential. 
Whitehead distinguishes “enduring individuals as societies that are purely temporal, 
meaning that there is only one actual occasion at a time [from] spatiotemporal societies, 
in which many enduring individuals are combined.” (p.185) Whitehead, following 
Leibniz, further differentiates spatiotemporal societies into those that are aggregational 
and those that are compound individual on the basis of internal (or constitutive) relational 
organisation. In the former, the society as a whole “does not have any experiential unity 
that allows it to feel and act as an individual”; in the latter, by contrast, “there are 
experiences of a higher and more inclusive type that give the society as a whole an 
overall experiential unity. These higher-level experiences can be called presiding, 
regnant, or dominant, because they exercise greater power over the society as a whole 
than do any of the other members, thereby giving the society as a whole a unity of 
response and action in relation to its environment.” (Griffin 1998, p.186)15 
According to Griffin (1998), “exactly which enduring things should be considered 
compound individuals, rather than mere aggregational societies, is an empirical question, 
to be settled in terms of whether this behaviour seems to require a central agent with an 
element of spontaneity or self-determination.” (p.186) While conceding that the matter of 
                                                 
14 In Heideggerian terms, a commitment to ontological (or metaphysical) monism does not entail a 
commitment to ontical (or phenomenal) monism. 
15 It is crucial to appreciate that the Whiteheadian view is not that the many are one but rather that the 
many become one, and are increased by one; thus, the emergence of higher-level compound occasions of 
experience must be ontological (and not merely epistemological). 
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classification is an empirical issue, it is contestable whether this issue must – or even can 
- be settled by an appeal to behavioural criteria since experience is not necessarily 
correlated with behaviour. Consider, for example, people suffering from the condition 
known as Guillain-Barré syndrome who are completely paralysed yet also fully conscious 
(Searle 1992). Then there is Searle’s famous Chinese Room thought experiment (Searle 
1980) which purports to show how apparently intelligent behaviour can be produced in 
the absence of genuine understanding and awareness (that is, conscious experience). 
Finally, there is the logical possibility of zombies, that is, beings capable of replicating 
the behaviour of conscious beings without being conscious themselves (Chalmers 1996). 
Although the possibility of zombies is excluded under panexperientialism (since 
consciousness is causal on this view while necessarily being epiphenomenal on the 
alternative position), this does not undermine the central thesis of the preceding 
argument. This is because, as Griffin implictly concedes, behavioural criteria can only 
provide apparent, that is, epistemic evidence and hence, are inconclusive. 
Can aggregates and compound individuals be differentiated ontologically and, if so, 
how might this be done? A pointer in the direction of a possible solution is provided by 
Birch (1990) who maintains that 
 
the concept of an individual, from protons to people, involves the notion that each is what it is by 
virtue of its relationships with its environment. There are, of course, objects that are aggregates of 
natural entities such as a wheel that is still the same wheel whether it is turning or stationary. That is 
because the unity of the wheel is a mechanical one built into it by the engineer [emphasis added]. 
(p.75) 
 
It is maintained that in order to distinguish compound individuals from aggregates, it 
is necessary to augment conventional Whiteheadian panexperientialism with a 
phenomenological account of artificing that describes the ontologically distinct manner in 
which artifacts come to be16. According to Heidegger (1959, 1969), being and becoming 
are the ‘same’ in the sense that they belong together in essential, unitary relation. This 
onto-phenomenological perspective is consistent with that of panexperientialism in which 
it is maintained that the being (or existence) of an actual entity is its becoming or process. 
The upshot of this is that a difference in becoming (or process) entails a difference in 
being (or product); alternatively, a poiētic difference (that is a difference in way of 
coming-to-be) entails an ontological difference (Ali 1999). 
 
7. 5The Phenomenology of Artificing: I 
 
According to Lee (1999), “the artifactual and the natural belong to two very different 
ontological categories - one has come into existence and continues to exist only because 
of human purpose and design while the other has come into existence and continues to 
exist independently of human purpose and design.” On her teleological view of the 
distinction between nature and artifacts, “the artifactual embodies extrinsic [or] imposed 
teleology [which has its origin in human intentionality] while the natural (at least in the 
form of individual living organisms) embodies intrinsic [or] immanent teleology.” (p.2) 
                                                 
16 Although not all aggregates are artifacts (for example, stones and clouds), all artifacts are, it will be 
argued, aggregates. Formally speaking, the set of artifacts is a subset of the set of aggregates. 
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Crucially, Lee maintains that “an analysis in terms of Aristotle’s causes shows that all 
four causes, since later modernity, may be assigned to human agency.” (p.2)17 On her 
view, 
 
the initial elimination of the final and the formal causes from the study of natural entities and 
phenomena prepares the way ultimately for the introduction of human designs and purposes in the 
project of transforming the natural into the artifactual via science and technology. In other words, 
human agency, substituting for natural processes, becomes the predominant efficient cause. As the last 
half of the twentieth century shows, even the material cause is reduced to the ontological minimum, as 
nature is being manipulated increasingly at the level of atoms and molecules, not at the level of natural 
kinds, by human agency. (p.5) 
 
For example, in the context of a discussion of transgenic organisms, she maintains 
that 
 
not only are the formal, final, and efficient causes or transgenic organisms identified in human terms, 
even their material cause is the handiwork of humans. Humans have put together bits of genetic 
material in order to create them according to their own design. Ex hypothesi, such genetic materials 
would not have come together without deliberate human intervention. (p.53) 
 
However, to infer from statements such as the above that no in-principle limit to the 
reduction of intrinsic material causation in nature exists can be shown to be problematic 
for (at least) three reasons: First, only if the analysis of material causality is restricted to a 
specific phenomenal level – irrespective of which level and what the phenomena at this 
level are like - does the argument against establishing a priori ontological limits to 
artificing carry any weight since at lower - or ‘deeper’ - levels, the material cause remains 
natural or ‘given’ and hence, intrinsic; second, as Heidegger (1977) has shown, the nature 
(as essence) of artificing (that is, technology or artifact construction) is grounded in a 
subject-object orientation18 in which the substrate (or ‘matter’) of artificing is held out as 
objectively standing over against the subject. This is not a mere epistemic ‘regarding’;  
on the contrary, it is a hermeneutically-constitutive (and hence, ontological) way of 
relating to ‘the given’ through time and such way that the intrinsic being of nature is 
prevented from manifesting itself; third, on Whiteheadian panexperientialism, ‘first 
matter’, that is, the ultimate ontological substrate that is nature1, has an internal or 
subjective aspect that is technologically inaccessible yet ontologically-constitutive, 
thereby placing an ontological limit on the scope for manipulation of material causality 
by an increasingly ‘deep’ science and its concomitant technologies. 
In fact, Lee’s own position appears to be at least consistent with the view that 
ontological limits can be set to the technological project. For example, and again in the 
context of discussing transgenic organisms, she maintains that 
 
                                                 
17 Lee (1999), following Aristotle, “locates a crucial distinction between the natural and the artifactual in 
terms of the efficient cause.” More specifically, “in an artifactual entity, the efficient cause (as much as the 
formal and final causes) comes from without.” (p.50) 
18 That Lee (1999) would appear to concede this point is evidenced by her assertion that “in spite of 
quantum mechanics and its associated characterisation of reality, a considerable amount, if not the bulk of 
science [and technology] practiced today, is conducted within the Newtonian-cum-Euclidean framework.” 
(p.9) 
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transgenic organisms may be said to possess a much higher degree of artifacticity compared with 
organisms produced through the traditional means of breeding – their efficient, final and formal causes 
are humanly inspired, imposed and executed, while their material cause is technologically derived 
from other existing natural kinds [emphasis added]. (p.54) 
 
It might be further argued that her position is minimally consistent with Whiteheadian 
panexperientialism based on statements such as the following: “the account given so far 
may still be both partial and interim, serving to pave the way for a fuller exploration of 
the notion of independent value and its intimately related concept of the trajectory” 
(p.177); and even more directly, “a world without human consciousness is a world 
without recognised-articulated values, but it is not a world without mutely-enacted 
values.” (p.165)19 Yet to interpret her position in this panexperientialism-friendly manner 
is, ultimately, problematic given the following statement: 
 
To look for sameness between the human and the non-human in order to ground respect for the latter, 
perversely, may lead to the very trap of reductionism laid by the metaphysics of Scientific Naturalism 
itself. This postulates .. that ultimately all the differences, observed or otherwise, between natural kinds 
or between individual specimens belonging to the same or different natural kinds are au fond merely 
different arrangements of atoms and their molecules .. [The] program of molecular nanotechnology is 
predicated precisely upon that metaphysical foundation. The stuff of the universe is homogeneous and 
uniform. (p.183) 
 
There are (at least) three points to note in connection with the above: First, Lee 
implicitly assumes that a commitment to scientific naturalism entails a commitment to 
atomistic reductionism (or monism) of the conventional materialist kind. However, 
Griffin (1998, 2000) maintains that Whiteheadian panexperientialism is a form of 
naturalistic, atomistic monism, yet one which supports phenomenal pluralism and on the 
basis of active rather than passive (‘merely different arrangements’) organisational 
distinction20; second, and relatedly, Lee fails to distinguish between ontological (or 
metaphysical) monism and ontical (or phenomenal) monism; and third, Lee’s rejection of 
metaphysical monism per se (on Aristotelian substantialist grounds) means that she is 
faced with the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness (Chalmers 1996), that is, the problem of 
explaining how ontological subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-objective 
substrate. According to Lee,  
 
the ontological characteristics of independence and autonomy are primary while the axiological 
characteristics of being complex, intricate, sentient [that is, experiential] or whatever are secondary. 
Artifactual entities may amply exhibit the secondary axiological characteristics; ex hypothesi, they do 
not and cannot display the primary ontological characteristics which only naturally occurring entities 
and processes possess [emphasis added]. (p.180) 
 
                                                 
19 Lee (1999) distinguishes between intrinsic value or being ‘for itself’ (that is, striving to maintain 
functionality) and independent value or being ‘by itself’ (that is, coming-into-being and persisting as such); 
on her view, biotic (or living) entities manifest both kinds of value whereas abiotic (or non-living) entities 
manifest only the latter. 
20 It appears that Lee (1999) is led to reject monism because of a commitment to teleological pluralism and 
the intrinsic lawfulness of abiotic nature (or nature ‘by itself’). However, on Whiteheadian 
panexperientialism, there are no eternal laws, only enduring habits thereby allowing for a teleological 
pluralism grounded in a creative, ontological (that is, metaphysical) monism. 
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It is maintained that Lee’s claim that sentience is merely a secondary, axiological 
characteristic like complexity and intricacy is problematic for (at least) three reasons: 
First, it contradicts the phenomenological evidence that establishes experience as reality 
as it is in-itself; second, placing complexity, intricacy and sentience (or experience) in the 
same category constitutes an instance of category error since sentience is the condition 
for complexity or intricacy; and third, it engenders the ‘hard problem’. In addition, Lee’s 
position is problematic since in asserting that “artifactual entities may amply exhibit the 
secondary axiological characteristics”, she fails to consider the possibility that a 
characteristic may not manifest objectively, that is, in such a manner that it can be 
exhibited. Clearly, consciousness is an example of such a phenomenon and, on 
Whiteheadian panexperientialism, so is creativity. 
 
8. 6The Phenomenology of Artificing: II 
 
Ladrière (1998), in a synthesis of Aristotelian, Heideggerian, and Whiteheadian 
metaphysics, describes the essence of artificing in terms of “a transition from a state of 
[subjects] able to operate by themselves in the context of the interactions in which they 
participate, to a state in which natural elements become simply the passive [objects] of a 
function which is susceptible, in principle, of being realized as well on the basis of other 
[objects].” (p.75)21 Crucially, as he goes on to state, 
 
Poiesis [or techne in the sense of artifactual production] is a provenance which introduces into the 
linking of cosmic emergences a breaking off: it diverts some natural objects from their prior 
destinations and thereby breaks off the continuity of genesis [or physis in the sense of natural 
production]; it gives them a new destination which is no longer of a cosmic nature. But it can do this 
only by taking advantage of the availability of those objects, by transforming their capacity for 
entering into the genesis of more complex natural objects into a capacity of being used as the substrate 
for an unprecedented configuration which comes from elsewhere. (p.76) 
 
According to Ladrière, the essence of technique lies in the performance of “a sequence 
of operations organized according to an abstract schema of a general but applicable 
character” (p.81), a position that is consistent with both Negrottian artificiality and 
Whiteheadian panexperientialism. However, what is missing on all accounts – including 
Whitehead’s – given a panexperientialist metaphysic, is a description of the relation 
between the process of abstraction associated with artificing and the formation of non-
experiential aggregational societies. To the extent that abstraction involves the severing 
of contextual relations constitutive of the concrete phenomenon from which the 
abstraction emerges, it is readily construed as a process generating beings capable only of 
external (that is, accidental) relation. This is because contextual relations are spatio-
temporal, thereby allowing for the passage of occasions from subjectivity into objectivity 
(superjectivity), whereas abstraction – involving the elimination of the temporal – 
effectively ‘freezes’ (or hypostatizes) occasions, locking their being into an objective, 
purely spatial modality. On this basis, it might be argued that abstraction effects a 
                                                 
21 In the original citation, the terms in brackets are replaced by their opposites (that is, ‘subject’ by ‘object’ 
and vice-versa). The inversion is, however, necessary given the adoption of a panexperientialist 
metaphysics. (To be precise, on panexperientialism, the distinction is not so much between active subjects 
and passive objects as between self-acting subjects and other-acting objects.) 
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transformation (‘collapse’) of processual being into substantial being. In this connection, 
it is significant to note with Wiehl (1990) that “the abstract character of the causality of 
things and substances towards themselves as well as among each other are purely 
external relations, which only exist in the forms of [spatial] extension [emphasis added].” 
(p.143) Crucially, according to Spaemann (1990), “the reduction of actuality to the aspect 
of mechanical exteriority [that is, purely spatial extension] is nothing more than its 
anthropocentric reduction to whatever enables us to employ it for our purposes.” 
(p.159)22 With regard to the ‘blocking’ of the capacity for creative (that is, self or final) 
causation, Griffin (1998) maintains that, in complexes formed from actual occasions 
causally related to each other via purely physical prehensions, “there is virtually no 
origination of novelty.” (p.195) 
According to Ferre (1996a), “experience is fundamentally a field of internal relations 
in which some elements may have stronger or weaker levels of internal relatedness.” 
(p.354) Crucially, he goes on to maintain that “diminution of quality in subjective 
immediacy” can occur “either by forcing discordant elements on subjectivity or by 
negating elements of potential richness [emphasis added].” (p.360) Ferre (1996b) 
indicates the intrinsic temporality of such en-forcing – or, in Heideggerian (1977) terms, 
En-framing (Ge-Stellen) – in referring to “effective purpose sustained over time by 
constant renewal and refreshment [emphasis added].” (p.97) According to Sherburne 
(1966), “originality is both ‘canalized’ – to use Bergson’s word – and intensified” 
through hybrid prehension, that is, “the prehension by one subject of a conceptual 
prehension, or of an ‘impure’ prehension, belonging to the mentality of another subject.” 
(p.94) In the context of artificing (that is, the coming-to-be of artifacts), this ‘other’ 
subject is the human artificer. As Whitehead (1929) states, “when mentality is working at 
a high level, it brings novelty into the appetitions of mental experience. In this function 
there is a sheer element of anarchy. But mentality now becomes self-regulative. It 
canalises its own operations by its own judgements [emphasis added].” (p.34) This 
panexperientialist conception of artificing appears to be consistent with Negrotti’s 
(2001a) own view of this process, viz. “artificialists try to force the environment or the 
hosting organism to orient themselves only towards the same observation level taken in 
the design and in the building up of the artificial device.” (p.13) 
In summary, and according to Ladrière, “art adds to [the properties of natural beings] a 
totally emergent capacity.” (p.87) However, it is important to appreciate that such 
expansion in the artifactual sphere is necessarily offset by a corresponding and 
concomitant contraction in the natural sphere; in short, artifactual emergence, while 
grounded in the natural, is non-cumulative with respect to the latter. As he goes on to 
state, 
 
the technical universe, by generating novel forms, allows us to see the determinability and visibility of 
Being. But it thereby overshadows that other aspect of Being which is revealed in genesis, and, in a 
certain way also, in poiesis – namely, Being as availability, as reserve, as withdrawal, as that abyssal 
foundation from which comes the proliferation of forms, the profusion of the possible. (p.89) 
 
In short, artificing constitutes a ‘rupture’ of (and ‘irruption’ into) the natural. 
                                                 
22 Lee (1999) identifies “the philosophical basis for the transformation of the natural into the artifactual [as] 
Humean projectivism and the metaphysics of Scientific Naturalism.” (p.4) 
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9. 7Implications for “Strong” Artificiality 
 
If Whiteheadian panexperientialism is the way that nature is in-itself then the 
possibility of artifactually constructing replicants of natural phenomena – that is, “strong” 
artificiality - is radically undermined. This is because, as has been previously shown, 
artificing (construction, making) involves an orientation in which subjects stand in 
ontological opposition to objects, ‘rupturing’ the nexus of internal (constitutive) relations 
constituting natural beings so as to establish - more precisely, impose - external (non-
constitutive) relations between ‘primitives’ (components) in the synthetic (or artifactual) 
systemic complex. The implications of this conception of nature1 for artificiality are 
similar to those identified by Negrotti – but for very different reasons. 
For example, on Negrotti’s (1999a) theory of the artificial, “we can define A as a 
replication (in empirical terms and not logical) of B if A is the result of a reproduction of 
the exemplar B at all its observation levels by using the same materials and, more 
importantly, by drawing upon all its performances, without making any selection of 
essential performances.” (p.75) However, on this view, construction of a replicant (that 
is, an artifactual replication of a natural exemplar) is held to be impossible because such a 
synthesis “would require the analytical knowledge of the intimate relationships among 
[the elements taken to constitute the essential performances] at all possible observation 
levels. Since analysis implies selection of observation and representation levels – and 
analysis is, of course, the first step of scientific work – in scientific terms it is impossible 
to grasp reality as a whole.” (p.184) Although Negrotti appears somewhat reluctant to 
embrace such a position, as is evidenced by his reference to “the complex methodological 
difficulties, perhaps conclusive, which every attempt to cumulate multiple perfomances 
in an integrated artificial device is fated to meet [emphasis added]” (p.38), he maintains 
that replication is possible but in only three instances: (p.78) 
 
1. “When we know all the steps and all the components needed to reproduce something, for example, 
in the case of mass production; 
2. When we are able to act as combiners of natural elements which, when they are combined, are 
necessary and sufficient for producing a complete system, as, for example, in the case of artificial 
insemination; 
3. When the reality to be reproduced is composed or is describable from only one possible level of 
observation: this is clearly possible only for a reality man has himself created in purely formal or 
informational terms, as, for example, in the case of replicating a computer program.”23 
 
According to Negrotti (1999a), the difference between the synthetic and the artificial 
is that the latter necessarily “adopts materials and procedures which are different from 
those that constitute the exemplar, whereas the former, by definition, does nothing more 
than suitably combine natural constituents. The replication by synthesis is merely the 
generation of natural structures generated by the man who controls the required natural 
constituents [emphasis added].” (p.76) The problem with this view is that it assumes, 
                                                 
23 According to Negrotti (1999a), the replicability of technological systems follows from their closure, 
formality and capacity for finite description at a single level of observation. The non-replicability of natural 
systems, by contrast, follows from their openness, (partial) non-formality and capacity for infinite 
description at infinite levels. Clearly, a metaphysical assumption of hierarchical infinitism is being made. 
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erroneously, that the becoming of artifacts (or poiēsis in the mode of technē) is 
ontologically continuous with the becoming of naturals (or poiēsis in the mode of physis). 
For example, in (2) above, reference is made to the necessity and sufficiency of 
combined natural elements vis-à-vis the production of (natural) systems. However, on 
Whiteheadian panexperientialism, the process of concresence (that is, production or 
actualisation) of a systemic phenomenon – a high-grade actual occasion or ‘society’ - is 
marked by phases which can, crudely, be separated (if only for purposes of exposition) 
into the preparatory and the consummatory. The former involves partial constitution – 
efficient causation - of the systemic complex by prior actual occasions in their objective 
mode of existence while the latter involves partial self-constitution – final causation – of 
the complex via distinction (selection or ‘decision’) of incoming efficient causation into 
positively and negatively prehended (or ‘felt’) occasions (Griffin 1998). Granted that the 
combination of natural elements is necessary and sufficient for systemic production, it 
remains to distinguish preparatory necessity from consummatory necessity while locating 
sufficiency in the conjunction of the two. On this basis, it might be argued that it is 
possible for the human artificer to establish preparatory necessary conditions since these 
involve a subject (the artificer) putting objects (prior actual occasions) into a specific 
constituting relation; however, consummatory necessary conditions cannot be established 
in this way since consummation (or, in Whiteheadian terms, ‘satisfaction’) of an actual 
occasion involves an irreducible element of self-causation. Processes such as artificial 
insemination must, therefore, be understood as hybrid or impure from the perspective of 
their artificiality in that it is on account of their naturality that replication is possible24. 
However, it is crucial to appreciate that the role played by self-causation in the 
individual is not limited to its initial coming-into-being (or genesis). That this is the case 
follows from the fact that, on panexperientialism, beings are essentially processual; in 
short, beings are becomings. For example, and in the related context of human cloning, 
Ferré (1997) maintains that 
 
clones will be full human beings. But if personalistic organicism is correct, these full human beings 
will, as they develop toward maturity, be partially self-creating of themselves as the persons they 
become. This is the “miracle” in personhood, that each person is to a significant degree opaque to 
predictive science because each person is partially self-determining, within the twin constraints of the 
capacities provided by genetic endowment and the opportunities and challenges provided by 
environment. The miracle of personhood is that neither nature nor nurture - nor any combination of the 
two - is fully determining. (p.67) 
 
On this basis, he concludes that “personalistic organicism puts a full stop to the 
notion that persons can be replicated. Human organisms can and almost certainly will be 
cloned. But human persons, never.” (pp.67-68) Negrotti, himself, appears to support such 
a position in maintaining that ‘transfiguration’, that is, progressive bifurcation of the 
essential behaviour (or ‘performance’) of the artificial relative to that of its natural 
                                                 
24 According to Lee (1999), “there are degrees of ‘artifacticity’ depending on the degrees of control and 
precision with which science and technology manipulate nature.” (p.3) Given the ‘reflexive dynamics’ 
between natural and artificial systems (Negrotti 2001b), it follows that, ontically-speaking, there must also 
be degrees of naturality. Lee further maintains that “the degree of artifacticity of an artifact depends on .. 
the matter or stuff (the material cause) of which the object is made [and is] at its highest when humans 
succeed in designing the artifacts from scratch.” (pp.52-53) Once again, “the deeper the science and its 
accompanying technology, the greater the degree of artifacticity in the artifacts produced.” (p.85) 
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exemplar, arises from differences in their respective materials and processes – the 
‘inheritance principle’ – originating in the selective (or abstracting) act that is constitutive 
of the process of artifact construction25. 
Finally, in the context of a discussion of transgenic organisms, “whose historical 
origin and status were those of an human artifact”, Lee (1999) maintains that “in the wild, 
the natural processes of selection and evolution would, over time, subdue, if not totally 
eliminate, such a history in its progeny, reverting it to the status of being naturally-
occurring entities.” (p.97) The reference to ‘wildness’ is crucial here since in a wholly 
artifactual universe, there would nor could be no natural, that is, non-human, processes 
that could effect what might be referred to as the self-re-organisation of the natural (Ali 
1998, 1999)26. 
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